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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DORTHA NIELSON MORTENSEN and 
ROBERT STANLEY MORTENSEN, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
DWIGHT BROWN dba 
DWIGHT'S AUTO WRECKING, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 20080713-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal as a case transferred from the Utah 
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah Code Ann.; and for which this 
court granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 5 Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the trial court correctly deny defendant Dwight Brown's dba Dwight's 
(hereinafter "Dwight's") Motion for Summary Judgment after determining that genuine 
issues of material fact existed as to whether Dwight's intentionally failed to report the 
decedent's employment and payroll for the purpose of avoiding paying worker's 
compensation insurance premiums and payroll taxes for the decedent's employment. 
Is Dwight's, as the decedent's employer, entitled to protection from suit by the 
exclusive remedy provision of Utah's Workers Compensation law when he fraudulently 
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cheated the system by purchasing a Worker's Compensation policy based on reported 
employment and payroll of a few part time employees; while actually employing the 
decedent and numerous other employees under the table and intentionally failing to report 
their employment and payroll to avoid paying insurance premiums and employment 
taxes? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and denial of a motion 
for summary judgment for correctness. Orvis v. Johnson, 111 P.3d 600, \6 (Utah 2008). 
The appellate court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. "A summary judgment movant must 
show both that there is no material issue of fact and that the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)." Id. at 1J10. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for wrongful death. Plaintiffs Dortha Mortensen and Stanley 
Mortensen (hereinafter "the Mortensens") are the parents of the decedent James Carl 
Mortensen (hereinafter "James"). James was killed on November 20, 2003 at Dwight's 
auto salvage yard. James was twenty years old at the time of his death. Dwight's was 
James' employer and is the owner of the salvage yard. James was crushed when an 
automobile he was working under came down, crushing his chest. The Complaint is 
based on allegations of negligence on the part of Dwight's. 
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Dwight's claims immunity from suit based on his status as employer and the 
provisions of the exclusive remedy provision of Utah's worker's compensation law. 
Dwight's asserts that because he purchased a worker's compensation insurance policy he 
is entitled to immunity. The Mortensens counter that the exclusive remedy provision only 
protects employers who properly and in good faith obtain insurance coverage and pay 
premiums for ah of their employees. They claim the exclusive remedy provision does not 
protect employers who intentionally employ employees "under the table" and fraudulently 
fail to report employment and payroll for some of their employees to avoid paying 
premiums and taxes. Such fraud nullifies the exclusive remedy protection and subjects 
employers to civil suit for injuries and wrongful death of their employees. 
Dwight's never reported James' employment or payroll at any time prior to his 
death; despite the fact James had been employed by Dwight's full time for approximately 
eighteen months prior to his death. 
The evidence submitted in connection with the motion for summary judgment 
established that Dwight's did obtain a policy of worker's compensation insurance from 
Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah. However, in purchasing the policy Dwight's 
fraudulently understated the estimated amount of payroll. Dwight's stated an estimated 
amount of total annual payroll for all of his employees of $12,293; or an amount for 
approximately only three part-time employees. Dwight's did not thereafter report the 
decedent's and several other employees' employment and payroll. In the audit after the 
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end of the policy period, Dwight's reported actual payroll for only three part-time 
employees despite the fact he had at least six other employees. At no time prior to James' 
death did Dwight's report James' employment or payroll. In fact Dwight's fraudulently 
reported actual total payroll for the year of only $8,248 which was substantially less than 
the stated estimate. As a result of his fraud, Dwight's even received a partial refund of 
premiums paid. 
Even after James died and James' family had inquired into the question of 
worker's compensation benefits Dwight's chose not to be honest in his post policy period 
audit report and chose not to amend his prior filed employer's quarterly federal tax 
returns. Instead Dwight's asserted that James had only begun working for Dwight's at the 
very end of September 2003 and that James was Dwight's sole employee during the last 
quarter of 2003. The true facts were that James had been working for approximately 
eighteen months prior to his death and approximately six other employees were also 
employed by Dwight's. 
By fraudulently understating the amount of estimated payroll in connection with 
the purchase of the policy and then by failing to report the actual employment and payroll 
of the majority of his employees to Workers Compensation Fund and in his state and 
federal employer tax returns Dwight's fraudulently avoided paying workers compensation 
insurance premiums and taxes for James and the other non-reported employees. 
Dwight's filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and (following additional 
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discovery) a Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. The motions were based on 
alleged immunity from suit under the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's 
Compensation Act. The trial court properly denied both motions concluding that an 
employer who intentionally cheats on its obligation to report payroll is not "properly 
insured" and thus is not entitled to the benefits of the exclusive remedy provision of the 
Worker's Compensation law. The trial court found that numerous questions of material 
fact existed regarding whether Dwight's intentionally failed to report James' employment 
and payroll. 
Dwight's filed a petition for permission to appeal with the Utah Supreme Court. 
The case was transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals which granted this interlocutory 
appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs the Mortensens are the parents of the decedent, James. (R. 1, 7-8) 
2. Defendant Dwight's is the owner of Dwight's Auto Wrecking, an automobile 
wrecking and salvage business located in Sevier County, State of Utah. (R.l, 7) 
3. Dwight's hired James to work in the salvage yard commencing in the late 
spring or summer of 2002. (R. 544, 556) 
4. From the commencement of his employment until his death on November 20, 
2003 (approximately eighteen months) James worked as a full time employee of 
Dwight's. (R. 544, 556) 
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5. James was killed on November 20, 2003, while working for Dwight's at 
Dwight's automobile salvage yard. James died when an automobile he was working 
under came down crushing his chest. (R. 2, 7) 
6. Dwight's initially paid James $5.00 per hour. James was later given a raise to 
$6.00 per hour. (R. 545) 
7. James' work schedule was from 8:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. Monday through 
Friday with time off for lunch and from 9:00 a.m. until 1:00 p.m. on Saturdays. (R. 544). 
8. At the end of each work day James and his co-employees went into Dwight's 
office where Dwight Brown paid them in cash their wages for that day. (R. 544) 
9. James never received a paycheck and was never provided any record of time 
worked or income received. (R. 544) 
10. Dwight's did not provide James with a W-2, a 1099, or any other tax form for 
the year 2002. Likewise Dwight's did not provide James with a W-2, a 1099, or any other 
tax form showing income paid for the first three quarters of 2003. 
11. In July 2003 Dwight's also hired James' younger brother, Robbie Mortensen, 
to work the same schedule and perform the same type of labor as James. Dwight Brown 
told Robbie at the time he hired him he would be paid "under the table." Dwight Brown 
told Robbie the other employees were paid the same way. (R. 544) 
12. Robbie was not asked to fill out a W-4 form or any other tax or employment 
form. Dwight's never withheld any taxes from his wages. (R. 544-45) 
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13. During the time that Robbie and James worked for Dwight's there were at 
least five other employees who worked with them performing the same tasks including 
Todd Nebeker, Cameron Jacobsen, Jordan Brown, Trevor Page and another person called 
"Moose." (R. 546) 
14. Robbie observed that all of the employees were paid cash at the end of each 
day the same way that he and James were paid. (R. 546) 
15. During the time that James and Robbie were employed by Dwight's, Dwight 
Brown admitted on several occasions they were not covered by worker's compensation 
insurance. Robbie suffered minor injuries on the job three different times. When he 
reported the injuries, Dwight Brown instructed him that if he went to the hospital to not 
report the injury as work related. Dwight told Robbie, "If you report it on my worker's 
compensation I will get in trouble." (R. 545-46) 
16. On one occasion when James hurt his back, Dwight instructed James not to go 
to the doctor. Dwight Brown stated, "I don't have you on worker's comp." (R. 545-46) 
17. During the period of James' employment Dwight's obtained a worker's 
compensation insurance policy from Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah. The policy 
was issued January 15, 2003, and the policy period was March 2, 2003 to March 2, 2004. 
To calculate the premium to be billed for the year Dwight's was required to state to 
Worker's Compensation Fund an estimated total annual payroll amount. Dwight's 
intentionally understated his projected payroll. Dwight's stated an estimated annual 
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payroll for all employees of only $12,293. That amount was substantially understated in 
view of the fact James was working full time and Dwight's also had several other full and 
part time employees. By fraudulently understating his estimated payroll Dwight's 
received the benefit of a lower premium. (R. 85, 546) 
18. Workers Compensation Fund then requires employers to report the actual 
payroll paid to all employees during the policy period. Employers are required to report 
actual payroll paid in a final audit report. In some cases reports are required to be made 
quarterly. The reporting is substantiated by the submission to Workers Compensation 
Fund of copies of the Employer's Federal Quarterly Tax Returns and/or State 
Unemployment returns. Dwight's made his final report online and did not submit tax 
returns. Dwight's reported actual payroll of $8,248. (R. 563) (Citing the Deposition of 
Linda Haag, employee of Workers Compensation Fund pp. 14-22) 
19. The terms of the insurance policy also required Dwight's to report all payroll 
for all employees. PART FIVE C of the policy states how the premium is calculated and 
states in pertinent part: "This premium basis includes payroll and all other remuneration 
paid or payable during the policy period for the services of: (1) all your officers and 
employees engaged in the work covered by this policy." (R. 562) (A copy of the policy is 
attached as Appendix 6 to Appellant's Brief.) 
20. Similarly the policy required that Dwight's final premium be calculated based 
on the actual remuneration paid to his employees. PART FIVE E of the policy states in 
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pertinent part: "The final premium will be determined after this policy ends by using the 
actual, not the estimated, premium basis and the proper classifications and rates that 
lawfully apply to the business and work covered by this policy." (R. 562-63) (A copy of 
the policy is attached as Appendix 6 to Appellant's Brief.) 
21. Workers Compensation Fund also issued an Employer's Handbook to 
Dwight's in connection with issuance of the insurance policy. The Handbook also placed 
an obligation on Dwight's to report all payroll of all his employees. The insurance policy 
in PART FIVE A provides that the premium for the purchase of the policy is to be 
determined by WCF's manuals of rules, rates, rating plans and classifications which 
includes the Employer's Handbook. The Handbook on page 24 provides a definition of 
employee. Under the definition the Handbook states, "Payroll for all persons meeting this 
definition of an employee should be reported." (R. 562, 622) 
22. Not only did Dwight's misrepresent the estimated payroll amount in order to 
purchase the policy at a reduced rate he also fraudulently misrepresented the actual 
amount of payroll in his audit report at the end of the policy term. Worker's 
Compensation Fund's "Term Closing Payroll Entry" which reflects actual payroll shows 
that Dwight's reported only $8,248 in actual payroll. (R. 553-54; 571-72) 
23. Dwight's also fraudulently misrepresented his total payroll for all employees 
for 2003 in the four 2003 Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax returns and the 2003 State 
Unemployment Tax return that he filed. Dwight's total reported payroll for 2003 for tax 
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purposes was the same $8,248 amount reported to Workers Compensation Fund. (R. 553-
54, 571-84). 
24. Vicky Brown who is Dwight Brown's wife and Dwight's bookkeeper testified 
in deposition that Dwight's records show Dwight's employed only three persons in 2003. 
(R. 554) Dwight Brown also testified he had only three employees in 2003. Dwight 
Brown testified James did not start work until the end of September 2003. Dwight Brown 
also falsely testified that Robbie Mortensen and the five other employees identified by 
Robbie Mortensen were never employed by Dwight's. 
25. The only payroll records that Dwight's produced in discovery were some 
handwritten ledgers. Those ledgers identified only three part time employees during 
2003.l The payroll for those employees was the only payroll Dwight's reported for 2003. 
(R. 553-54, 571-73 and 602-06) 
26. Dwight Brown and Vicky Brown's deposition testimony and Dwight's internal 
ledgers directly conflict with the affidavit testimony of Robbie Mortensen who testified 
there were five other employees that worked for Dwight's during 2003 in addition to the 
three named in Dwight's payroll ledgers. (R. 546) 
27. Dwight's first Motion for Summary Judgment as well as his Renewed Motion 
for Summary Judgment are based in part on the factual assertions that James had been 
^ n e of those employees was only employed during 2003 prior to the time Robbie 
Mortensen was employed. There were at least eight total employees during 2003. 
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employed by Dwight's since only the end of September 2003, less than two months 
before his death.2 That position is directly controverted by the affidavit testimony of 
James' brother and co-worker Robbie Mortensen as well as the deposition testimony of 
James' mother and father which establish that James had worked continuously full time 
for Dwight's for approximately eighteen months prior to his death. (R. 71, 543-44 and 
551-52) 
28. During discovery the Mortensens obtained James' medical records from 
Sevier Valley Hospital. A billing record from the hospital shows James was admitted for 
services on November 8, 2002, more than a year prior to his death. Under the 
heading"Employer's Name" the billing statement lists "Dwight's". This evidence further 
contradicts Dwight's factual statement in support of his motion for summary judgment 
that James was not employed until the end of September 2003. (R. 570) 
29. In the absence of a civil action for wrongful death in this case the only 
compensation available to the Mortensens for the loss of their son is payment of the 
ambulance and emergency room charges and a small amount for funeral expenses. (R. 
56-67) (Citing the Deposition of Deborah Myer, employee of Workers Compensation 
Fund at pp. 6-7) 
2The end of September 2003 date is significant. Dwight's had not reported James' 
payroll in the approximate six quarterly federal tax returns filed prior to James' death. Following 
James' death Dwight's status as James' employer became common knowledge. By fraudulently 
stating that James only began work at the end of September Dwight's could report only the 
income paid to him during the last quarter of 2003 (October and November); and thereby 
continue his ruse. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The exclusive remedy provision of Utah's worker's compensation law provides 
employers with immunity from suit only if employers secure the payment of worker's 
compensation benefits by "properly" insuring and keeping insured payments of such 
compensation. An employer who fraudulently avoids paying premiums for such benefits 
by intentionally failing to report all employment and payroll for all employees is not 
"insured" for purposes of the exclusive remedy provision. Employers are not immune 
from suit for injuries and death to employees whose payroll has not been reported and 
premiums for that payroll have not been paid. 
Dwight's did not report the employment or payroll for James, and did not pay 
premiums for the payroll paid to James at any time prior to James' death. Dwight's is 
thus not protected from suit by the exclusive remedy provision of Utah's worker's 
compensation law. 
Numerous questions of fact exist as to Dwight's fraudulent intent. The trial court 
correctly denied Dwight's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court's 
decision should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Correctly Denied Dwight's Motion For Summary Judgment. 
Section 34A-2-201 Utah Code Ann. requires all employers in the State of Utah to 
secure and provide worker's compensation benefits for their employees. Section 34A-2-
201 Utah Code Ann. provides three options for employers to provide such benefits and 
12 
states in pertinent part: 
An employer shall secure the payment of workers' compensation benefits 
for its employees by: 
(1) insuring, and keeping insured, payment of this compensation with the 
Worker's Compensation Fund; 
(2) insuring, and keeping insured, the payment of this compensation with 
any stock, corporation or mutual association authorized to transact the 
business of workers' compensation insurance in this state; or 
(3) obtaining approval from the division in accordance with Section 34A-2-
201.5 to pay direct compensation as a self-insured employer... 
If employers comply with the requirements of Section 34A-2-201 Utah Code Ann. 
their employees and their beneficiaries are entitled to recover the statutory benefits 
allowed under the Utah Workers Compensation Act for their injuries and death that occur 
during the course of their employment; regardless of fault. In exchange employers are 
granted immunity from suit for their employees' job related injuries and death. The 
exchange is a quid pro quo. However, if an employer fails to provide such benefits there 
is no quid pro quo and the exclusive remedy provision of the Act does not apply. In those 
cases employers are subject to suit by their employees or their heirs for injuries and death. 
Section 34A-2-207 Utah Code Ann. states: 
Employers who fail to comply with Section 32A-2-201 are not 
entitled to the benefits of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational 
Disease Act, during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a 
civil action to their employees for damages suffered by reason of personal 
injuries arising out of or in the course of employment caused by the 
wrongful act, neglect, or default of the employer or any of the employer's 
officers, agents, or employees, and also to the dependants or personal 
representatives of such employees when death results from such injuries. 
In Sheppick v. Albertson 's, Inc., 922 P.2d 769 (Utah 1996) the Utah Supreme 
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Court explained this doctrine. The Court stated: 
[I] fan employer fails to comply with the insurance requirements stated in 
Utah Code Ann. Section 31-1-46, [the predecessor statute to Section 34A-2-
201] which requires employers to either provide workers' compensation 
insurance or to be self-insured if the Commission finds that certain 
requirements are met, an employee may sue in district court for personal 
injuries "arising out of or in the course of employment caused by the 
wrongful act, neglect or default of the employer or any of the employers' 
officers, agents or employees". 
See also Anabasis. Inc. v. Labor Commission, 30 P.3d 1236, 1241 n.5 (Utah App. 2001). 
In this case Dwight's did not comply with the requirements of Section 34A-2-201 
with regard to the decedent, James. Rather Dwight's hired and paid James "under the 
table". Dwight's fraudulently failed to disclose James' payroll and the payroll of several 
other employees in the payroll estimate Dwight's stated to obtain the policy from Workers 
Compensation Fund for the period in which James died. Dwight's failed to state James' 
payroll even though at that time James was employed full time; and had been for several 
months. Indeed Dwight's never reported James' payroll to Workers Compensation Fund 
at any time prior to James' death. Neither did Dwight's withhold state or federal income 
tax from James' compensation and never withheld FICA compensation. 
Likewise Dwight's did not include James' income in approximately five 
Employer's Federal Quarterly Tax Returns or in the State Unemployment Returns that 
were filed for the time that James was employed by Dwight's. Indeed at no time prior to 
James' death did Dwight's report James' employment or payroll to Workers 
Compensation Fund or to the federal government or to the State of Utah; even though 
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Dwight's was required to do so by the terms of the insurance policy, the Workers 
Compensation Fund standard policies and procedures and by federal and state law. 
Only after James' death when Dwight's employment relationship became an issue 
of potential liability did Dwight's acknowledge James as an employee. Even then 
Dwight's chose to continue his ruse and reported James' payroll for only the few weeks 
prior to his death. Dwight's also chose not to amend his prior filed tax returns to correct 
his omission of James' income for the prior eighteen months. Indeed Dwight's chose to 
continue his fraudulent scheme by taking the position that James had only been employed 
commencing the end of September 2003. By coming up with the end of September 2003 
as James' hire date Dwight's schemed to cover his prior reporting failures by falsely 
showing the only compensation paid to James was during the last quarter of 2003, i.e. 
October and November. Under the scheme James' payroll would then only need to be 
included in the last quarter's 2003 Federal Quarterly Return. 
Likewise by choosing not to amend his tax filings Dwight's schemed he could 
avoid producing the tax returns in any end of term audit required by Workers 
Compensation Fund. The problem with Dwight's ruse is that he failed to comply with 
Section 34A-2-201 Utah Code Ann relating to James at any time prior to James' death. 
Thus under the terms of Section 34A-2-207 Utah Code Ann. the Mortensens are entitled 
to maintain a civil suit against Dwight's for James' wrongful death. 
In denying the Motion for Summary Judgment the trial court relied upon Thomas 
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A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1989) and Anabasis, 
Inc. v. Labor Commision, 30 P.3d 1236 (Utah App. 2001) for the proposition that to be 
insured under Section 34A-2-201 Utah Code Ann. an employer must be "properly 
insured". To be "properly insured" the trial court stated: 
There are two requirements. First, "an employer must insure its employees 
with workers' compensation insurance." Id. at 1240. Second, "an employer 
must keep all its employees insured for workers compensation". Id. (R. 
665) (Emphasis added) 
The trial court properly focused on the word "all" employees which is not only 
used in the case law but is also used in the policy and in the Workers Compensation 
Handbook. Those authorities require employers to insure ah of their employees to be 
properly insured. Indeed any other analysis defies logic. An employer cannot be deemed 
to have provided insurance for an employee the employer intentionally chose not to 
insure. By not reporting James' employment and payroll and by failing to pay insurance 
premiums on his behalf Dwight's effectively chose not to provide benefits for James. 
Dwight's argued in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment that his under-
reporting made no difference because under the terms of the policy Dwight's had the 
ability to report the actual correct payroll at the end of the policy period. The trial court 
was not persuaded because Dwight's did not report James' actual payroll at the end of the 
policy period when he had the opportunity to do so. The trial court thus concluded 
Dwight's under-reporting and failure to report were intentional. At a minimum the court 
found genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the issue of intent. 
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In its first Memorandum Decision denying Dwight's initial Motion for Summary 
Judgment the trial court also properly analyzed that when an employer chooses not to 
properly report payroll and in essence does not obtain insurance and pay premiums for an 
employee there is no quid pro quo for the immunity from suit. The trial court relied upon 
Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 16 P.3d 555, 560 ( Utah 2000) and Hunsaker v. State, 
870 P.2d 893, 899 (Utah 1993) for its analysis. The trial court's analysis was correct. 
There can be no quid pro quo when what is being given in exchange for what is received 
is not in fact given with respect to an individual employee. The facts are clear James' 
employment and payroll were never reported prior to his death and no premiums were 
paid on his behalf. James died during the period of noncompliance. 
II. The Trial Court Correctly Found That Genuine Issues Of 
Material Fact Exist Which Precluded Summary Judgment 
The trial court's denial of Dwight's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment was 
based in part on a determination that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether 
Dwight's intentionally under reported payroll. The trial court was correct. 
Dwight's Motion was based in part on a statement of fact that James was hired by 
Dwight's at the end of September 2003. The Mortensens however submitted the 
Affidavit of Robbie Motensen together with deposition testimony of both Dortha 
Mortensen and Stanley Mortensen establishing that James was hired in the early spring or 
summer 2002. The medical billing record from Sevier Valley Hospital also established 
that James informed the hospital in November 2002 that he was employed by Dwight's. 
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There is clearly as issue of fact as to James' hire date. The issue is relevant because if the 
finder of fact determines that James was indeed hired approximately eighteen months 
before his death, Dwight's failure to report James' income for that length of time is highly 
relevant to Dwight's fraudulent intent. 
There are also issues of fact as to how many employees Dwight's employed during 
2003 and their employment dates. Dwight's reported actual total payroll for 2003 for all 
employees of $8,248. Dwight Brown and Vicky Brown testified as to having only three 
part time employees in all of 2003. Dwight's internal ledgers also show only three part 
time employees. Dwight's even testified in deposition that Robbie Mortensen and several 
of the other named employees never worked for Dwight's. In contrast Robbie Mortensen 
testified by affidavit that while he worked for Dwight's in 2003 at least seven employees 
were employed. These issues are material because if the finder of fact determines Robbie 
Mortenson and the other named employees were employed by Dwight's in 2003 such a 
finding is a determination that no payroll was ever reported for James' employment prior 
to his death. Such a finding is also highly relevant to Dwight's fraudulent intent. 
There are also issues of fact as to whether Dwight Brown admitted to James that 
James was not covered under worker's compensation insurance. There are also issues of 
fact as to whether Dwight Brown made the same admissions to Robbie Mortensen. Again 
these issues are material and relevant to Dwight's fraudulent intent and scheme. There 
are also issues regarding other terms of James' and other employees' employment that are 
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also relevant to the issue of whether Dwight's intentionally failed to report James' and the 
other employees' payroll. A determination by the jury of intentional wrongdoing 
logically would lead the jury to determine that insurance coverage for James was not 
obtained or paid for. 
All of these issues of fact must be resolved before the jury can answer the bigger 
factual question of whether Dwight's secured the payment of worker's compensation 
benefits for its employees by "insuring and keeping insured" the payment of such 
compensation as is required by Section 34A-2-201(l) Utah Code Ann. The Mortensens, 
as the pairties opposing the summary judgment motion are entitled to an interpretation of 
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom resolved in their favor. Under 
that standard the trial court correctly denied the motion for summary judgment. 
III. Dwight's Is Not Entitled To Immunity From Suit Under The Exclusive 
Remedy Provision Of The Workers Compensation Act 
The evidence submitted by the Mortensens in opposition to Dwight's Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment established that Dwight's intentionally failed to report 
James' and several other employees' employment and payroll. As such at the time of 
James' death Dwight's was not in compliance with the terms of the WCF policy, the 
terms of the WCF Employer's Handbook, and most importantly, Section 34A-2-201 Utah 
Code Ann. 
This case is similar to Shifflett v. McLaughlin, 407 S.E.2d 399 (W.Va. 1991) in 
which the employer paid its part time employees in cash and did not report their 
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employment on any tax returns or workers' compensation payroll reports. One of the part 
time employees was killed in an automobile accident while being driven by a co-
employee. The personal representative of the decedent filed a wrongful death action in 
court. The employer defended claiming the benefits of immunity under Workers' 
Compensation law. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia ruled in favor of 
the plaintiffs holding that when an employer fails to report payroll the employer becomes 
delinquent for purposes of workers' compensation law and is not entitled to the protection 
of the exclusive remedy. The employer also asserted that because the decedent died 
before the end of the month following the quarter in which premium payment was 
required to be made the employer was not actually delinquent. The court addressed that 
argument as follows: 
As stated in the Kosegi v. Pugliese, [407 S.E.2d 388 (1991)] payments are 
due before the end of the month following the quarter. During hearings, 
appellees' counsel also contended that because the death of Mark Shifflett 
occurred before the end of the month following the quarter in which the 
Better Business Systems was required to remit a payment, the appellee was 
not delinquent. By that reasoning, an employer could always correct a 
delinquency in the case of death, by paying within the required period, even 
though not reporting the wages. The flaw in this argument is obvious. 407 
S.E.2d at 402 n. 8. 
Similarly in Buerkley v. Aspen Meadows Limited Partnership, the Supreme Court 
of Montana ruled that an employer was not entitled to the protection of the exclusive 
remedy provided by worker's compensation laws when the employer paid the employee 
"under the table", had not made payroll deductions from his paycheck, paid the employee 
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in cash and had not reported the employee's payroll to the worker's compensation 
provider. The court ruled: 
[T]he requisite quid pro quo is absent when an employer has deliberately 
avoided the cost of insuring an employee by failing to acknowledge his 
existence in its payroll records. In such cases, an employer should not be 
able to take refuge behind the exclusive remedy provision. Id. 980 P.2d at 
1049. 
Similarly in the Wyoming case of Robinson v. Bell, 767 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1989) the 
employer sought protection of the exclusive remedy provision of Wyoming's worker's 
compensation statute by making retroactive payments to secure insurance after the 
employee had been injured. Because the employer had not shown the employee on its 
first payroll report that was filed following the hiring of the employee, the court found 
the employer had not qualified for protection under the Wyoming statute. The Court 
stated: 
[N]owhere in this statute, nor elsewhere in the Act, is it remotely suggested 
that an employer can obtain immunity from suit by applying for a worker's 
compensation account after his employee has been injured.... The clear 
import of the statute is that, when an employer was not qualified under the 
Act at the time of injury to an employee, the employer had no immunity. Id. 
at 180. 
Similarly in Muffett v. Royster, 195 Cal. Rptr. 73 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1983) the 
California Court of Appeals held that where an employer had required the employee to 
pay a portion of the premiums for worker's compensation insurance, the employer's 
blatant failure to comply with the terms of the act prevented the employer from claiming 
the benefits of the exclusive remedy provision. The court stated: 
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To allow the employer to raise the workers' compensation act as a bar to the 
civil suit where the employer so blatantly fails to comply with so 
fundamental a part of the act, would be inconsistent with the purposes of 
the act. 195 Cal. Rptr. at 80. 
Likewise in this case, the requirement that Dwight's report "all" payroll of "all" 
employees from the time that Dwight's first hires each employee is a fundamental part of 
the quid pro quo granted in exchange for protection under the exclusive remedy. As the 
trial court noted in its Memorandum Decision on Dwight's first motion for summary 
judgment, the words "insuring and keeping insured" found in Section 34A-2-201(l) 
require that the employer be "properly insured". Memorandum Decision, page 3 citing 
Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Commission, 770 P.2d 125 (Utah 1989). (R. 230-
235) Being "properly insured" requires reporting "all" payroll for "all" employees. The 
law should not allow Dwight's to blatantly abuse the worker's compensation system to 
pay employees under the table for purposes of avoiding taxes and payment of worker's 
compensation premiums. The trial court's denial of Dwight's Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be affirmed. 
IV. Allowing Dwight's To Hide Behind The Exclusive Remedy Provision 
Would Effectively Deny The Mortensens A Remedy For The Loss Of Their Son. 
If the Mortensens are denied the ability to pursue the claims raised in this action 
they will effectively be denied a remedy for the loss to them of the life of their son. 
During discovery the Mortensens took the deposition of Deborah Myer, a claim manager 
for WCF. Ms. Myer testified in her deposition that in the absence of a civil suit the only 
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worker's compensation benefits that could be awarded on behalf of James are the 
payment of medical expenses for James' ambulance ride and emergency room visit; 
together with a small amount for funeral expenses. She testified no other compensation 
is available or could be paid absent recovery in a civil action for wrongful death. (R. 566-
67) (Citing Deposition of Deborah Myer, pages 6 and 7. 
It would be against all equity and good conscience to allow Dwight's to 
fraudulently avoid payment of taxes and insurance premiums by paying employees under 
the table and not reporting their payroll; and then allow Dwight's to claim the benefits of 
the exclusive remedy provision. The law does not reward such fraudulent conduct and 
should not in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision denying Dwight's Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be affirmed. 
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